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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Learning from mistakes and incidents has long 
been seen as a cornerstone of safety management as 
far back as the Heinrich (1941) triangle for safety 
management where he shows that for each major 
accident or incident there are many near misses and 
unsafe conditions.  
Therefore it is crucial to ensure that each and 
every hazard is identified and assessed as demon-
strated within the Carter and Smith (2006) statisti-
cal model for accident causation whereby an uni-
dentified hazard will have both an unknown 
severity and likelihood and therefore an unknown 
risk to the organisation. In order to ensure that or-
ganisations have as many risks identified as possi-
ble, Safety Management Systems (SMS) are in-
creasingly rolled out within organisations and more 
recently becoming a regulatory requirement (Civil 
Aviation Authority (UK), 2010; Edwards, 2005; 
Mitchison & Papadakis, 1999; Stolzer, Halford, & 
Goglia, 2010).  
One of the common features of a SMS is a sys-
tem of eliciting hazard reports from staff within the 
organisation and using these reports to augment the 
risk model within the organisation (Edwards, 2005). 
Therefore a key factor in the performance of a SMS 
will be the quality of data being submitted via haz-
ard reports from staff.  
There is a lot of existing literature addressing the 
steps organisations should consider when rolling 
out a SMS reporting system focusing on both the 
cultural (Dekker & Stoop, 2012; J Reason, 1997; 
James Reason, 1998, 2004) and the design and im-
plementation of a reporting system (Lawton & 
Parker, 2002; Williamsen, 2013). While this litera-
ture can provide a large amount of guidance for the 
development of a reporting system, there is no uni-
fied methodology to assess a reporting system and 
to provide weighting on the importance of these 
factors. 
Within Safety Management there are two prima-
ry approaches to reporting, Proactive and Reactive. 
Proactive approaches are intended to identify risks 
before they lead to a loss within the organization, 
reactive approaches in comparison report after a 
loss has happened with the intention of preventing a 
reoccurrence of similar incidents (Johnson, 2003).  
Reporting has been moving towards a proactive 
approach, previous methodologies such as the 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) (Boeing 
Airplane, 2000) were focused on analysing an inci-
dent after they it occurred by providing taxonomy 
for the assessment of an incident. These approaches 
only produce a safety benefit after an unsafe inci-
dent has happened which is somewhat paradoxical. 
Proactive techniques allow the robustness of a sys-
tem to be monitored and should allow the risk as-
sessment to be constantly updated. This approach is 
also reinforced by industrial standards such as the  
which require a constant review of standards. In or-
der to maintain performance of a SMS reporting 
system steps need to be taken within the organisa-
tion in order to ensure that quality reports will be 
continuously submitted into a SMS. The SAT is in-
tended to unify the existing literature into an as-
sessment methodology, which will provide criteria 
for a reporting system to be scored against and, cru-
cially, provide a weighting on the impact of influ-
encing criteria based on industrial case study expe-
rience.  
Self-assessment tools have been previously used 
within organisational human factors case studies. A 
notable example can be found in Nieva and Sorra 
(2003) whereby a self-assessment approach was 
successfully used within a hospital environment to 
provide a way of assessing the safety culture. The 
self-assessment tool developed to assess safety re-
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porting will look at a broader focus compared to the 
safety culture assessment in Nieva and Sorra (2003) 
however the concept has been used successfully 
within an organisational human factors case study.  
 
The SAT will be developed in the following 
steps: 
1. Identification of Criteria and Scoring 
2. Prototyping and initial development 
3. Industrial Feedback & Validation  
 
The SAT is intended to be used across a variety 
of different industries therefore certain sections will 
have to be adapted to suit the industrial context. 
The most notable of these will be the regulatory en-
vironment category. Initially the SAT will be tar-
geted to the Biotech manufacturing and the Aero-
space Maintenance Repair and Overhaul 
organisations. 
2 SELF ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
A review of available literature was carried out 
which exposed 6 high level evaluation criteria for 
the SAT which are shown in Table 1 
 
Table 1 High Level Assessment Criteria Evaluation Criteria Sub Criteria Meeting the Require-ments of the Regulatory Environment Regulatory Requirements “Good Practice” Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of reporting Procedure Reporting Form Design Reporting Procedure 
Provision and value of Feedback 
Feedback loop To Reporters Value of Feedback for the organization Value of good catches to the organization Education and Promotion of the Reporting System Training Reporting Awareness Motivation Safety Culture Stimulation of Reporting External Influences from the Industrial sector External factors 
 
 
 
A literature review was carried out covering the 
thematic areas that were identified and shown with-
in Table 1.  
Once a high level overview of a reporting pro-
cess was established the high level categories 
shown in Table 1 started to emerge. Once these cat-
egories were established the literature review on the 
evaluation criteria shown in Table 1was carried out 
and the individual assessment criteria were devel-
oped. 
In each of the categories there are a number of 
statements, each of these statements will reflect the 
best practise that has been identified within the lit-
erature, the assessor will then rate each of these 
statements reflective of their organisation.  
2.1  Meeting the Requirements of the Regulatory 
Environment 
The Regulatory Environment will vary depend-
ing on the industry that is being assessed. Typically 
safety critical industries such as Aerospace and the 
Process industry have fairly explicit regulations 
governing the use of reporting systems within Safe-
ty Management.  Obviously the regulatory envi-
ronment will depend on the industry the SAT is be-
ing applied to; therefore initially two industrial 
regulatory environments will be proposed the aero-
space maintenance industry and the biotech indus-
try  
Within the aerospace industry the international 
governing body of civil aviation ICAO produces a 
Safety Management System manual, which calls for 
a methodology to collect information from staff 
with regards to incidents that can occur within the 
working environment.  EASA Part 145 specifically 
requires for a Safety Management system that in-
volves collecting information on incidents, near 
misses and hazards within the organisation.  This 
requirement is reflected within the industrial best 
practice, the overall industrial body looking after 
the interest of international civil aviation ICAO 
(2006) published a Safety Management System 
Manual, which also calls for a methodology to col-
lect information from staff with regards to incidents 
that can occur within the hanger.  However both the 
EASA Part 145 regulations and ICAO do not pro-
vide any specific guidance on the steps that should 
be implemented to stimulate reporting within an or-
ganisation and solely provide technical require-
ments that should be fulfilled. However regional 
bodies operating under the EASA framework do 
provide additional guidance material, an example of 
this can be found within the United Kingdom Civil 
Aviation Authority’s CAP716 publication (Civil 
Aviation Authority (UK), 2006) 
For the Process industry; the European Union 
Seveso (E.U, 2012) directive requires for a safety 
management system that incorporates near miss re-
porting and management. However the idea of in-
cluding near misses (which may lead to an acci-
dent) in the safety management system is relatively 
new.(Jones, Kirchsteiger, & Bjerke, 1999). Fur-
thermore Seveso incorporates mandatory reporting 
of accidents involving hazardous substances onto a 
Europe Wide register called the MARS database. 
(Major Accident Reporting System) which is a pub-
lically available database to facilitate “the exchange 
of lessons learned from accidents and near misses 
involving   dangerous substances” (European 
Commission, 2012). Again the regulations simply 
state that an organisation has to have an accident 
and near miss reporting system, however there is no 
direct guidance as to how organisations should set 
up and monitor the a reporting system so the SAT 
could provide guidance that could plug this gap in 
the literature.  
Regulations can also require organisations to 
maintain mandatory reporting. The EASA Part 145 
regulations for aerospace maintenance for instance 
require organisations to perform “Mandatory Oc-
currence Reporting” wherein certain incidents 
and/or near misses that concern airworthiness of an 
aircraft (EASA, 2013) will also have to be consid-
ered in a reporting system.  
The regulations provide a bare minimum level of 
safety management. For instance the EASA 145 
regulations requires that there is a reporting system 
implemented as part of the SMS and management 
are encouraged to promote safety management as 
one of the pillars of safety management depicted 
within the International  Civil Aviation 
Organisation (2013) manual for Safety Manage-
ment, however safety managers could benefit from 
more concrete guidance on safety promotion and a 
way to ensure that they would be compliant with 
regulations.  . Previous industrial experience such 
as Cromie et al. (2012) shows that a lack of man-
agement involvement in a SMS can seriously affect 
the performance of the SMS. While the SAT will 
go considerably beyond what the regulations cur-
rently provide, due to the impact non-compliance 
can pose to an organisation it would be negligent 
not to consider compliance as an assessment crite-
rion.  
In addition the SAT could be extended to provide 
guidance to Safety Management as to how to assess 
these areas using techniques such as task modelling 
as described within (Builes, Balfe, Leva, & 
Douglas; Douglas, Cromie, Leva, & Balfe, 2014) 
and provide a form of assessment beyond what the 
regulations currently provide for. 
2.2 Usability of reporting forms and feasibility of 
reporting Procedure 
 
This concerns the design of the reporting form 
and the procedures surrounding reporting. There 
has been previous research into design considera-
tions for the reporting form The method of report-
ing was highlighted as a factor that can affect the 
uptake of reporting: reporting forms that increase 
the level of paperwork, do not allow the reporters to 
report the details they want to report,reporting sys-
tems that are intrusive or take them away from their 
day-to-day operations can all affect reporting. 
(IMO, 2008; Leveson, 2011; Oltedal & McArthur, 
2011). Methods like the day-to-day methodology as 
described within Leva, Cahill, et al., (2010) are in-
tending to solve this problem by providing a way of 
integrating reporting in the daily operations. In this 
case by developing a web based reporting system 
that integrates existing paperwork requirements 
with the report collection system and also provides 
a benefit to staff by using the reporting data to pro-
duce a shift handover briefing automatically which 
could simplify the process for staff.  The reporting 
method should be easily accessible, should not be 
time consuming and should be designed to slip-
stream into their daily work practises. Kongsvik, 
Fenstad, & Wendelborg, (2012) highlight that some 
industries such as the maritime industry have large 
levels of paperwork and are reluctant to increase the 
amount of paperwork, which suggests than an ap-
proach that would utilise existing paperwork as a 
method of data collection may be a good way for-
ward. Lappalainen, Vepsäläinen, Salmi, & 
Tapaninen, (2011) conducted a survey of attitudes 
to reporting within the Finnish maritime industry 
and found that reporting “requires excessive pa-
perwork, and thus maritime personnel felt that the 
safety management system burdens them with use-
less practices” (Lappalainen et al., 2011, p. 9). 
Long forms, complicated procedures or insufficient 
time within their workflow are also identified as a 
deterrent in Evans et al., (2006).  
The form design and procedure is possibly the 
factor that is under the largest level of influence 
from safety management. Research within industry 
has commonly found that a poorly designed form 
can be a significant barrier to reporting (Kongsvik, 
Fenstad, & Wendelborg, 2012) and that organisa-
tions will frequently purchase commercial-off-the-
shelf solutions (Douglas, Leva, & Cromie, 2015) 
for their safety management systems. These ap-
proaches may not be suitable for all industrial envi-
ronment and can potentially pose a significant bar-
rier to reporting when compared to bespoke 
solutions that are designed with the specific indus-
trial context in mind, an example of this can be 
found within Leva, McDonald, Sordo, Righi, and 
Mattei (2014)  where a proactive reporting and risk 
management system was implemented around ex-
isting work practises to ensure that the act of report-
ing does not lead to an increase in paperwork and 
workload ensuring that staff have the resources to 
submit reports and ultimately there will be better 
data beings submitted into the SMS.  
The SAT can provide a method of assessing the 
design and application of a reporting system with 
regards to its industrial context and to expose areas 
where management will be able to augment the 
SAT to improve its application within industry.  
2.3 Provision and value of Feedback 
 
The importance of adequate feedback within the 
reporting culture has long been cited as an im-
portant factor for reporting. In Evans et al., (2006) 
over two thirds of the interviewed hospital report-
ing staff had identified lack of feedback as the 
greatest deterrent to reporting within the hospital. 
This is also reflected by O’Leary, (2002); Reason, 
(1998, 2004) which all stress the importance of 
feedback within the reporting culture. Furthermore 
the ISO, (2011) 31000 standard for risk assessment 
stresses the importance of feedback within all levels 
of the risk assessment process, reporting could form 
part of that process. The presence of feedback to 
reporters is a key consideration for the health of a 
reporting system 
Reason, (1991, 1997) highlights that organisa-
tions should keep reporters up-to-date with any ac-
tions that are taken based on reports received. See-
ing that their reports are analysed and used to 
actively improve safety can significantly improve 
the reporting culture within an organisation.  
The role of feedback to reporting was also refer-
enced in the (Cooper, 2000) model of safety culture 
using the principle of reciprocal determinism 
wherein management attitudes can affect the level 
of reporting, and reporters can also influence man-
agement attitudes.   
Feedback can also be provided through action, 
for example a member of staff submits a near miss 
report citing an unsafe scaffolding, the scaffolding 
is replaced quickly after the report is submitted and 
crucial the reporter has seen that their report pro-
duced an improvement in safety (Johnson, 2003).  
While the existing literature stresses the im-
portance of feedback, for instance both Reason and 
Johnson stress that reporting will decline signifi-
cantly without a decent level of feedback; there is 
little literature on how this feedback should be de-
livered. There has however been research into pos-
sible methods such as how to use visual feedback 
such as dashboards, newsletters etc. but there is a 
gap in the literature that actually looks at the effec-
tiveness of the feedback. One of the intentions of 
the case studies is to ask staff in different industries 
about how they would like to see feedback and the 
effectiveness of different approaches with a scope 
of developing an ability to assess the suitability of 
the feedback method as part of the SAT.  
There is also organisation-wide feedback carried 
out in some organisations (Johnson, 2003) for ex-
ample a European airline publishes frequent “news 
letters” (O’Leary, 2002) that provide feedback that 
is seen by the whole organisation based on error re-
ports and their subsequent investigations. This can 
act as a way to stimulate reporting organisation 
wide as staff will see that reports are taken serious-
ly by management. While this method may work 
for a large organisation such as an airline a SME 
may not simply have the numbers of incidents 
and/or safety information to make a newsletter via-
ble or enough resources to produce one. An exam-
ple of news letters can be found within the Chirp 
(Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting 
Programme) is an aviation (since 2003) and mari-
time reporting programme. (CHIRP Charitable 
Trust, 2007) It is an independent reporting system 
for all individuals employed or associated within 
these industries. The identity of reporters to CHIRP 
is kept confidential, information about the report is 
made accessible to the industry as freely available 
feedback newsletters that are sent out to the various 
industries within aerospace (Such as Commercial, 
General Aviation, Maintenance) CHIP gets a good 
level of response as reporters are confident it will 
be confidential, and that the reports they make will 
be helpful to their colleagues within their industry. 
(CHIRP Charitable Trust, 2007) This reinforces the 
ideas put forward in Reason (1997) in where feed-
back is important to encourage reporting. CHIRP is 
always managed by a charity that is separate and 
unrelated from the Airlines, Air Traffic Control 
providers, Maintenance Providers and Regulatory 
authorities, so there is no fear of ramification.  
As with the design and procedure criteria, the 
feedback is another area which is under the influ-
ence of management. Existing regulations and in-
dustrial standards including ISO31000 (Iso, 2009) 
frequently call for feedback but provide no real 
guidance as to how this should be delivered within 
the organization despite how critical feedback is to 
the performance of a reporting system (Evans et al., 
2006; McAfee & Winn, 1989). The SAT could 
form a way for management to assess the level of 
feedback they give, determine its effectiveness and 
to identify ways of improving the feedback given 
within the organization.  
2.4 Propagation and Education of Reporting 
Systems 
 
Many organizations are stimulated to set up a re-
porting system either by regulatory or industrial 
best practice. Leveson (2011) highlights that in-
structions to organizations to develop or increase 
use of a reporting system are commonly found in 
official reports to incidents and naturally organiza-
tions keen to prevent incidents from reoccurring 
will implement a reporting system as per the inves-
tigation recommendations.  However organizations 
frequently fail to keep a sustained reporting system 
in place and the uptake of a reporting system fre-
quently declines after a period of time as shown in 
industrial case studies such as in Cromie et al., 
(2012) where the use of a reporting system declined 
shortly after the system was implemented, therefore 
in order to achieve a consistent improvement of 
safety from a reporting system; organisations will 
have to implement steps to ensure that staff will 
continue to make reports after it has been imple-
mented. 
The role of management in the education and 
propagation of reporting has frequently been citied 
within the literature. For example in Schein, (1973) 
it is argued that management should set an example 
for the safety behavior within the organization. In 
the reporting context this involves management en-
couraging staff by setting the example from above 
and providing endorsement and support from the 
staff within the organization onto the importance of 
reporting and to encourage “safe” behaviors in this 
way. 
Smith (1999) found that there is a major flaw” in 
the idea that people will do what you want if you 
positively reinforce the behaviour, it can potentially 
have the opposite effect, people offered money to 
complete a simple task took 50% longer than those 
who were asked to do it for nothing.   
There is debate within the literature regarding the 
roles of mandatory and voluntary reporting sys-
tems. Cohen, (2000) provides evidence from indus-
try that fully voluntary reporting systems actually 
produce better quality reports than mandatory-
reporting systems would produce and could also 
serve as an indicator for the safety culture within 
the organization as reports coming in a voluntary 
system will be submitted as a result of a good atti-
tude from a reporter.  
As discussed within the literature and industrial 
experience, the use of mandatory approaches to re-
porting do not appear to provide a concreate im-
provement in safety due to the key driving factor is 
to meet a metric and not to improve safety within 
the organization (Croxon, 2014), therefore the SAT 
will aim to assess the various criteria that will allow 
an organization to move to a non-mandatory ap-
proach to reporting. Mandatory approaches are 
common within industry (Douglas et al., 2015) 
however they frequently produce large amounts of 
“junk” reports with little safety benefit and require 
considerable staff workload to pick out the useful 
report. Therefore the SAT can be used as a tool to 
assist the organization in moving to a voluntary ap-
proach to reporting by assessing the cultural and 
educational initiatives within the organization and 
to suggest additional steps that could be rolled out.   
2.5 Motivation 
There are several motivational factors that can 
influence the likelihood of a person to take the time 
and effort to submit an accident report into the sys-
tem.  These motivational factors have been ex-
plored by studies such as McDonald, Corrigan, 
Daly, & Cromie (2000) that developed the “Stami-
na model|” for human factors which included ele-
ments such as the individual and organizational 
roles in human factors. 
Management have to be seen to be engaged and 
leading the reporting system (Kotter, 1996) by both 
providing feedback to the reports and by leading 
through education and other approaches such as 
newsletters, safety dashboards etc. The safety cul-
ture within the organization has a critical role in the 
success of a reporting system. Studies such as 
Waring (2005) highlight the cultural barriers than 
can exist within healthcare organisations and the 
challenges these barriers can bring to the successful 
uptake of a reporting system. Within hospitals there 
are steep hierarchies within staff, and Waring 
(2005) found that high-level staff like consultants 
were highly unlikely to make reports while low lev-
el staff such as junior doctors were far more likely 
to do so. Therefore there has to be considerable 
steps implemented to overcome these deep-rooted 
cultural concerns. A reporting system will only 
generate a good level of response throughout the 
organisation if there are no cultural barriers that 
will negatively affect a group within the organisa-
tions confidence to report.  
 
One potential way of improving the culture to 
the point where people will make reports without 
the fears of ramification would be to establish a 
“Just” culture (Dekker, 2012). A just culture ac-
cepts that human error is inevitable and is a policy 
where honest mistakes can be reported without any 
fears of ramifications in the hope of improving 
safety.  However the “justness” has to be balanced 
by both sides so dangerous acts of negligence also 
have to be dealt with accordingly through culpabil-
ity agreements etc. (Dekker, 2012; Reason, 1997).  
A Culpability agreement is an agreement with 
staff and management. An example can be found in 
Baines Simmons (2011) and it includes the follow-
ing categories. 
A Culpability agreement would assist in the de-
velopment of a just culture, as staff will be briefed 
that genuine errors and concerns are tolerated and 
unacceptable behaviours are not tolerated. As re-
ported within Walton (2006) junior members of 
staff may be reluctant to highlight errors or poten-
tial errors by a more senior member of staff, a cul-
pability agreement that encourages non-punitive re-
porting to improve safety may work to overcome 
this potential barrier.   
 
A popular methodology of attracting staff to use 
a reporting system is the “Behavior Based Safety” 
approach. BBS emerged in the 1980s as a simple 
way to encourage staff to behave in a “safe” manner 
(Geller, 2005). In Lingard & Rowlinson (1997) Be-
havioural Based Safety is described as the analysis 
of hazards associated with an employee’s job is car-
ried out and specific behaviours representing safe 
and unsafe behaviours are identified. These behav-
iours are then made to be the bases for the meas-
urement of the employee’s safety performance. 
Measurement can be carried using a specific in-
strument or by observation in the work place. Moti-
vational activities that focus on the desired behav-
iour are then implemented and the monitoring is 
continued for effectiveness. These activities could 
exist as rewards for positive safety behaviour, such 
as a cash reward for providing a  report on a good 
near miss (Lingard & Rowlinson, 1997).  While the 
intention of BBS approaches is clear they run the 
risk of simply rewarding an individual behaviour 
but not changing their attitude towards safety. In 
fact Smith (1999) argues that positive reinforce-
ment can cause resentment between management 
and employees. Due to the nature of BBS ap-
proaches the SAT should aim to stimulate organisa-
tions to move away from these action reward ap-
proaches since BBS approaches have the risk of 
simply rewarding a single “good” behaviour but fail 
to encourage a reporter to develop a safer world 
view and mind-set which is a key potential benefit 
of a reporting system. One of the ultimate aims of 
an industrial case study that is described within 
Douglas et al. (2015) is to assess the effect safety 
reporting has on hazard perception with the aim of 
developing the self-assessment tool as a way to help 
organisations sustain reporting without the need for 
BBS approaches.  
 
2.6 External Factors 
The external factors criterion focuses on indus-
trial factors outside of the organisation. These can 
range from the impact of disasters elsewhere within 
the industry to ligation concerns (Waring, 2005). 
While these factors aren’t under the influence of the 
management, they can have a profound impact on 
the performance of a reporting system within indus-
try and as a result the management should imple-
ment initiatives in order to lessen their effects. 
The SAT can therefore consider the impact of a 
incident, litigation etc. on the health of a reporting 
system and possible initiatives that could be im-
plemented by management in order to mitigate 
some of these external effects.   
3 NEXT STEPS 
Now the assessment criteria for the SAT have 
been identified the tool can be developed. Once the 
assessment criteria have been selected the next step 
will be to select the scoring system for the self-
assessment tool. Due to the role reporting has with-
in safety management systems it is proposed to im-
plement a model of safety management  maturity as 
the scoring system for the self-assessment tool. The 
Safety Culture maturity model (McCusker, 2001) 
developed by the UK health and safety executive 
provides five levels of safety culture, ranging from 
an emerging safety culture (Level 1) to a continual-
ly improving safety culture level 5. Each level of 
the safety culture features an improvement in both 
consistency and safety culture from the previous 
level. While this maturity model is focused at gen-
eral safety culture, it will still be suitable for the use 
of reporting culture as reporting culture is widely 
accepted to be a component of the wider safety cul-
ture (James Reason, 1998; Wang & Sun, 2012). 
The McCusker (2001) maturity model was adapted 
by A. D. Swain (1983) based on experience within 
the aerospace industry. The Edwards (2005) model 
consists of the following five levels of safety man-
agement 
 
• No or Very Little Safety Management 
• Just the Basics 
• Managing Safety Reasonably Well 
• Proactive safety and efficiency 
• Innovative on safety and efficiency   
 
The levels from the Edwards (2005) model are 
more suitable for the use in self-assessment while 
still based on the accepted model for safety culture 
maturity.  These 5 levels from the Edwards (2005) 
will be used to provide a quantitative score for each 
of the criteria. This can then be used to provide a 
quantitative method for assessment and using tech-
niques such as dashboards etc. they can then be 
used to help managers monitor the performance of 
the reporting system and provide guidance for im-
provement.  
 
3.1 Validation 
The tool will be validated throughout the devel-
opment lifecycle of the tool. The criteria will be 
validated using an example of a deficient reporting 
system scenario. A number of participants will be 
asked to score the various sections based on the 
mocked up case study and an inter-rater reliability 
analysis will be used to assess the effectiveness of 
the self-assessment tool. The Validity of the SAT 
will also be monitored during the implementation 
phase based on focus groups of users.  
The primary area of validation will come from 
case study experience in the Biopharma and Aero-
space Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul industries 
where action research approaches have been used to 
expose areas for the SAT and to determine impact 
weighting for the assessment process. The research 
techniques that have been used involve semi-
structured interviews, task modelling and a bespoke 
survey methodology as outlined within (Douglas et 
al., 2015). These approaches will be used to vali-
date the assessment criteria and also to determine 
the score weighting that will be used to develop the 
assessment report.   
3.2 Tool Platform 
The tool will be developed using an online web 
based system which has been demonstrated to be 
successful in previous research projects such as the 
development of the “daily journal” safety manage-
ment system as described within Strauch (2015) 
where a similar platform approach was used suc-
cessfully within an organisation.  
Since the SAT is seen as part of an overall meth-
odology to assess reporting it will share the plat-
form with the SCOPE tool and it is planned to have 
a concept of interoperability for the self-assessment 
tool. SCOPE is a software tool developed by TCD 
to allow a process to be modeling using a BPM 
similar approach (Builes et al.; Douglas et al., 
2014), integrating the SAT with this platform will 
assist within the overall development process.  
It is intended for the tool to be used by safety 
managers, therefore it is envisioned that the criteria 
assessment score will be outputted to a dashboard 
system that will provide a quick and easy overview 
on the deficiencies within their reporting system 
and will provide an easy indication on where im-
provements can be made. The dashboard approach 
will be particularly useful in the process of ensuring 
regulatory compliance which is cited within the lit-
erature as a key driver for the rollout of a reporting 
system (Leveson, 2011).  
4 CONCLUSION 
There is currently a large amount of literature to 
provide guidance on the areas that should be con-
sidered when developing a reporting system. How-
ever there is no current methodology of monitoring 
the performance and compliance of a reporting sys-
tem. This paper depicts the design process that will 
be followed in developing this new methodology of 
assessment. Once a prototype has been developed 
then the assessment tool can be validated and im-
plemented as part of the overall InnHF methodolo-
gy   
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